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I. Introduction
I am delighted to be here this morning. Among the many
issues confronting law enforcers today, consumer privacy and
cybercrime are among the most challenging. The Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") role as the nation's chief consumer
protection agency requires us to focus carefully on these, and a
whole host of consumer protection, issues, using the unique tools
available to us. Even as we track trends and adopt new
technologies, our fundamental mission remains the same: to
identify the most egregious forms of fraud and deception;2 to bring
cases, on our own and with our law enforcement partners; 3 and to
educate ourselves about emerging issues, the industry about
complying with the law, and consumers about how best to protect
themselves from fraud and deception.4
' Hosted by the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, University of
North Carolina, Sept. 26, 2003. The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any individual commissioner.
2 Consumers reach the Commission through our Consumer Response Center
which provides phone, mail, and web-based consumer access. The complaints
are stored in Consumer Sentinel, our web-based database of consumer fraud
complaints and an investigative cyber tool with more than 750 law enforcement
agencies as members, and in the FTC's Identity Theft Clearinghouse, which
provides victim assistance and data for law enforcers.
3 The Commission brings cases pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the
FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2003). Our law enforcement efforts target fraud
and deception and address the full range of consumer protection issues. In our
telemarketing fraud efforts, for example, the FTC has organized and led fifty
federal-state enforcement sweeps against fraudulent telemarketers since 1995,
resulting in 1,725 law enforcement actions.
4 Virtually all of the Commission's 400 consumer and business education
publications are available at our comprehensive website, http://www.ftc.gov. In
just the last year, the Commission distributed more than 3.86 million
Today, I want to discuss the FTC's efforts to address
consumers' concerns about personal privacy and the critical role
that online and offline security play'in that program.
II. Fighting Internet Fraud
First, let me say a word about our role in fighting one
growing type of cybercrime--consumer fraud. Although the
Internet has empowered consumers with instant access to a breadth
of information about products and services that would have been
unimaginable twenty years ago, fraud artists have also proven
adept at exploiting this new technology for their own gain. They
are the ultimate "early adopters" of new technology. And, they've
seized on the Internet as a ready vehicle to find victims for their
scams. In fact, our consumer complaint data show that consumers
increasingly report the Internet as the initial point of contact.for
fraud and that the Internet has now outstripped the telephone as the
source of first contact for fraud.5
Many of these frauds are simply online variations of
familiar offline scams. However, we also see more sophisticated
practices that exploit the very technology of the Internet,
sometimes going as far as literally taking control of the consumers'
computers away from them.
To combat these new frauds, the FTC has brought over 200
Internet-related enforcement actions. This is also one of a number
of areas where we are looking for ways to work closely with
criminal law enforcement agencies. For example, last year the
Commission sued John Zuccarini for "mousetrapping" consumers. 6
Zuccarini registered some 6,000 domain names that were
publications, including 78,000 in Spanish, and recorded more than 15 million
page views of consumer and business information on the FTC website, including
more than 250,000 on pages with Spanish information.
5 Complaint data, of course, may not be representative, particularly regarding the
level of violations occurring. We have just completed field work on a
nationally-projectable survey that will give us much better information on the
incidence of fraud, and the means that fraudsters use to reach out and pluck
someone.
6 FTC v. John Zuccarini, No. 01-CV-4854, 2002 WL 1378421 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9,
2002).
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misspellings of popular websites. Surfers who looked for a site but
misspelled its Web address were taken to the defendant's sites.7
Once they arrived, Zuccarini's websites were programmed to take
control of the consumers' Internet browsers and hold the
consumers captive while they were forced to view dozens of
websites advertising products such as online gambling, psychic
services, and adult websites. The obstruction was so severe in this
case that consumers were often forced to choose between taking up
to twenty minutes to close out all of the Internet windows, or
turning off their computers and losing all of their "pre-mousetrap"
work.
After being sued, Mr. Zuccarini disappeared. s Fortunately,
as a result of a cooperative working relationship between FTC
attorneys and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York, he was arrested in a south Florida hotel
room. 9 At the time of his arrest, Mr. Zuccarini was surrounded by
computer equipment and cash, all of which were seized by
criminal authorities. He was not left empty-handed, however. A
United States Postal Inspector served him with the Final Court
Order in our case.
Similarly, we all know that unsolicited commercial e-mail,
or spam, is a nuisance, but we now know it is also a ready source
of fraud. We are probably the only people in the country that
actually like to get spain, and we are currently collecting over
100,000 spams a day that are forwarded to us from all over the
country. When we looked at the content of this spain, we found
7 Id. For example, Zuccarini registered fifteen variations of the popular
children's cartoon site, http://www.cartoonnetwork.com ("cartoon netwok"
instead of "cartoon network"), and forty-one variations on the name of teen pop
star Britney Spears.
8 Id. In light of this development, the Court permitted the Commission to serve
Mr. Zuccarini electronically.
9 Benjamin Weiser, Spelling It 'Dinsey, 'Children on Web Got XV, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at B 1 (Late Edition). The indictment charged Zuccarini
with violations of the Truth in Domain Names Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(B)(b)
(2003), a section of the new Amber Alert law that makes it a crime to divert
children to obscene material. It is the first prosecution under the statute, which
President Bush signed this past spring.
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that two-thirds contained clear indicia of falsity. 1° Just one
example is spams selling bogus domain names. After September
11 th, these spams even urged consumers to "Be Patriotic! Register
.USA Domains," and at one point even peddled ".God" domain
names. 1' The only trouble is, neither domain is usable on the
Internet. We estimate these scammers took in more than one
million dollars before we got a court order shutting them down and
freezing their bank accounts and other assets. And again we got
help from our law enforcement partners, this time the Office of
Fair Trading of the United Kingdom, where the defendants were
located. 12
III. Emergence of Consumer Privacy Issues on the Internet
In addition to fighting online fraud, protecting consumer
privacy is a priority of the FTC's consumer protection program.
Privacy has always been an important issue for American
consumers. Fueled by the development of the Internet, privacy
emerged as a major consumer issue in the mid-1990s. Given the
breadth and depth of the concerns, almost everyone in government
wanted to do something about consumer privacy. What to do was
10 FTC, FTC MARKETING PRACTICES REPORT, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM, at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf (Apr. 30, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Furthermore, our
analysis of spain has found that it is rarely sent by established businesses. In
fact, in a random sample of 114 pieces of spam, we found that none was sent by
a Fortune 500 company and only one was sent by a Fortune 1000 company.
Based on this sample, we can be ninety-five percent confident that less than five
percent of the 11.6 million pieces of spam in our database came from Fortune
1000 companies.
11 Complaint, FTC v. TLD Network, Ltd., No. 02-C-1475 (N.D. I11. Feb. 28,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/03/tldcmp.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
12 See Press Release, United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading, Misleading
Domain Name Ads Stopped, at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/News/Press+releases/2002/PN+53-02+Misleading+
domain+name+ads+stopped.htm (Aug. 29, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The U.K.'s Office of Fair Trading
("OFT") assisted the FTC staff in its investigation of the defendants and serving
legal process. OFT later negotiated written assurances from defendants that they
would not publish similar advertisements for the registration of domain names.
less clear. Although consumers expressed high levels of concern
about their perceived loss of privacy,1 3 they also expected and
relied on the benefits of our information-driven economy. For
example, few consumers seem worried about the many companies
that have to share their information to clear checks or, for that
matter, to process ATM transactions. They generally understand
that the information must be collected and shared to complete the
transaction. Indeed, surveys reveal that most Americans are
"privacy pragmatists," who care about privacy but are willing to
share information when they see tangible benefits, and they believe
care is taken to protect that information.'
4
By the time FTC Chairman Timothy Muris and I arrived at
the Commission in June 2001, the agency had spent several years
developing a sophisticated understanding of privacy issues through
conferences and workshops. Industry, spurred by consumer
interests and the Commission's activity, had begun addressing
consumers' concerns, especially by posting privacy policies on
commercial websites. Nevertheless, at that time many people
equated support for privacy protection as support for legislation
13 That concern has been expressed in many public opinion polls. See, e.g.,
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY ON AND OFF THE INTERNET: WHAT CONSUMERS
WANT, at http://www.aicpa.org/download/webtrust/privrpt_21mar02.pdf (Feb.
7, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
IBM/HARRIS INTERACTIVE, IBM MULTI-NATIONAL CONSUMER PRIVACY
SURVEY, at http://www- 1.ibm.com/services/files/privacysurveyoct99 I.pdf
(Oct. 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users'
Attitudes About Online Privacy (Apr. 14, 1999), at http://www.research.att.com/
projects/privacystudy/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
14 See Humphrey Taylor, Most People Are "Privacy Pragmatists" Who, While
Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It Offfor Other Benefits (Mar.
19, 2003), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=365
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). According to
the March 2003 Westin/Harris Interactive poll, sixty-four percent of adults
polled are "privacy pragmatists" who are often willing to permit the use of their
personal information if they are given a rationale and tangible benefit for such
use and if they sense that safeguards are in place to prevent the misuse of their
information. As discussed below, however, in a notice and choice system, most
of these consumers are unlikely to take the time and effort to understand the
benefits and costs of a specific sharing of information in individual transactions.
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requiring "notice, access, and choice" (otherwise known as "Fair
Information Practices") before personal information was collected
on the Internet. 15 That seemed to us to be an odd form of
consumer protection. Why should information collected via paper
and pencil be treated differently than the same information
collected online? And why should legislation discriminate against
the burgeoning development of e-commerce?
IV. The New Framework
One of our first efforts was to develop a framework for
addressing consumers' privacy concerns. Privacy was a new topic
for us, one that we studied in-depth. We held dozens of meetings
with groups with diverse perspectives on privacy-ranging from
consumer groups to trade associations to information technology
executives to professors. We read academic, legal, and policy
literature in addition to numerous briefing memos from the FTC
staff. We found widespread agreement on the importance of
privacy issues and the importance of the FTC in protecting
consumers' privacy.
The debate over privacy showed clearly the importance of
relying on strong principles to guide an institution like the FTC
through new territory. Grappling with the issues surrounding
privacy required careful consideration of the basic questions of
15 In its 1998 Report, the FTC summarized widely-accepted principles regarding
the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information, known as Fair
Information Practices ("FIPs"): (1) notice: data collectors must disclose their
information practices before collecting personal information from consumers;
(2) choice: consumers must be given options about how personal information
collected from them may be used for purposes beyond those for which the
information was provided; (3) access: consumers should be able to view and
contest the accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and (4)
security: data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure that information
collected from consumers is accurate and secure from unauthorized use. The
report also identified enforcement-the use of a reliable mechanism to impose
sanctions for noncompliance with these fair information practices-as a critical
ingredient in any governmental or self-regulatory program to ensure privacy
online. See MARTHA K. LANDESBERG ET AL., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23.htm (June 1998) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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common law-why should the government protect privacy and
what role should the government play in defining and enforcing
privacy rules for private exchange? Strong principles were needed
to ensure that if the Commission went beyond enforcing a
particular contract provision to provide new "rules of the game," it
would develop those rules based on a deep understanding of the
issues and an appreciation of the possible harm of restricting the
many consumer benefits that an information-based economy
offers.
V. The Inadequacy of "Fair Information Practices"
One of our first steps was to evaluate the adequacy of the
Fair Information Practices ("FIPs") approach to privacy protection.
This is an appealing model because it is seemingly based on
consumer consent, on contracts between consumers and
businesses. In practice, however, consent is illusory. For most
consumers, the costs of exercising the choice-although not
high-are not worth the perceived benefits. Consider the billions
of privacy notices sent to consumers under Gramm-Leach-Bliley
("GLB"). Very few consumers have exercised their right to opt-
out of information sharing. Part of the problem, no doubt, is the
difficulty of understanding some of the notices. Hopefully, we can
improve the notices, but a more fundamental problem exists.
Exercising just one opportunity to opt-out may take only a few
minutes, but opting out for each of the companies you do business
with would take much longer. Consumers have many other
options-not to mention demands-for their time, from paying
bills to getting dinner on the table and to helping children with
homework. Given that time is scarce and even reading the notice
takes effort that could be spent elsewhere, it is not surprising that
few consumers opt-out, even when it is seemingly easy.' 6
16 Of course, some consumers may care a great deal about protecting their
privacy, and be willing to make the effort to exercise choice. Under an opt-out
regime, these consumers will identify themselves by opting out. In essence,
only those who believe the issue is worth seriously considering bear the costs of
considering the choice.
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Nor is opt-in the solution. Because most consumers will
not expend the time and effort to consider the choice, opt-in is only
the correct default if most fully-informed consumers would refuse
to share information.' 7 Explaining the benefits and costs of
information sharing is beyond the competence of even the best
drafted short notice. We cannot make people focus on this, or any
other, issue. With GLB privacy notices in particular, we led
people to the privacy question, and they chose not to choose.
Thus, the FIPs model has fundamental limitations. Because
considering the choice imposes costs apparently in excess of the
benefits for many consumers, applying the model would simply
reflect inertia, rather than revealing what consumers want.
Moreover, legislation codifying the principles runs the risk of
unnecessarily hobbling development of the many benefits that an
information-based economy could offer consumers.'i It is hard to
describe in advance technology or beneficial information uses that
have not been invented or even considered.
17 Under opt-in, consumers who value highly the benefits information sharing
makes possible must make the effort to exercise choice. Those who are more
concerned about privacy can ignore the choice.
18 Implementing FIPs can itself require difficult distinctions. In our recent
Information Flows workshop, a senior vice president of an international hotel
company stated that a caller in Germany who wishes to make a reservation for a
hotel in Washington, D.C. would probably call a reservation center in
Amsterdam, which would use a computer data center in Georgia to make the
reservation. The company might be pulling data from other countries as well.
He noted that under the European opt-in privacy model, his company must go to
great lengths to disclose to consumers that their reservation information will be
transferred overseas to be processed by a computer in Atlanta. He stated that
this is very costly in the aggregate, even if it only adds five to ten seconds to
each call. Moreover, consumers do not find this information helpful and may
even find it confusing or annoying. Of course, a sensible application of FIPs
leads to the conclusion that notice and choice are unnecessary in this context.
But if we make an exception here, why not elsewhere? This example, and many
others like it, illustrate the difficulty of making reasonable distinctions when
applying FIPs in practice. See FTC, INFORMATION FLOWS: THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES OF THE COLLECTION AND USE OF
CONSUMER INFORMATION, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infoflows/
infoflowstranscript.pdf (June 18, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
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If FIPs is not the answer to consumer concerns about
privacy, what is? In contrast to the one-size-fits-all approach in
FIPs, our current approach balances the benefits of information
sharing with protection of consumers from the misuse of that
information. 1
A. Focus on Misuse of Consumer Information
Consumers benefit from legitimate uses of information;
such uses do not cause their privacy concerns. They are
concerned, however, that information, once collected, may be
misused to harm them or disrupt their daily lives. It is these
adverse consequences that drive consumer concerns about privacy.
These include physical harm---certainly, parents do not want
information on the whereabouts of their kids to be freely available.
The misuse of information also can cause economic harm. Such
harm includes denial of credit, or even a job, based on inaccurate
or incomplete information. In extreme cases, the misuse of
information also can lead to identity theft, our top consumer
complaint category for three years in a row. Finally, the misuse of
information can cause annoying, irritating, and unwanted
intrusions in daily lives. These include the unwanted phone calls
that disrupt dinner or the spam that clogs our computers.
B. Explicit Recognition of Trade-Offs
Our approach to targeting practices that involve misuse of
consumer information reflects the reality that any regulation
designed to protect consumer privacy involves trade-offs. Privacy
is not, nor can it ever be, an absolute right. Every day, consumers
make practical compromises between privacy and other desirable
goals, like having our briefcase or backpack inspected at the
airport or before entering a building or a sports arena. These trade-
offs exist in the commercial sphere as well, where information-
19 FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Protecting Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and
Beyond, Remarks at The Privacy 2001 Conference, at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/muris/privisp 1002.htm (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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sharing poses risks but also offers benefits. Our privacy agenda
seeks both strong protection of privacy and preservation of the
important benefits of our information economy.
C. Focus on Online as Well as Offline
Finally, the FTC's previous efforts were primarily focused
on addressing consumers' concerns about online data collection. If
the concern is reducing the adverse consequences that can occur
when information is misused, then it does not matter whether
information is originally collected online or offline. 20 It simply
matters if it is misused. The risk of identity theft, for example, is
no less real and the consequences no different if a thief steals your
credit card number from a website or from the mailbox in front of
your house. Equal treatment of information collected online or off
provides better protection for consumers. Moreover, a level
playing field for online and offline businesses is less likely to
impede the continuing growth and development of Internet
commerce.
VI. FTC Privacy Program
For two years, we have implemented these principles
through a variety of privacy initiatives-from our National Do Not
Call Registry enabling consumers to stop unwanted telemarketing
sales calls21 to our efforts to combat deceptive spam and to our
20 For example, the Commission has brought cases challenging
misrepresentations about the uses of information collected in surveys of students
conducted in class. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In re Educational Research
Center of America, Inc., No. L-4079, 2003 WL 21100697 (F.T.C. May 6, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/ERCAdecision&order.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Complaint, Educ.
Research Ctr., 2003 WL 21100697, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/
ERCAcomplaint.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); In re Nat'l Research Ctr. for Coll. & Univ. Admissions, No. L-
4072, 2003 WL 221365 (F.T.C. Jan. 28, 2003).
21 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2002).
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enforcement and education efforts involving financial 22 and
children's privacy.23 To achieve our goals, in each of the past two
fiscal years, we have increased significantly the agency resources
devoted to privacy. In Fiscal Year 2002, we increased the
resources devoted to privacy issues by sixty percent. Compared to
2001, the FTC now spends several times more resources on
protecting consumer privacy.
A. Information Security and Identity Theft
As we crafted the framework, it became clear that a key to
protecting consumer privacy is protecting the security of consumer
information. A great many "breaches of privacy" are actually
security lapses rather than conscious decisions to share
information. 24 Poor information security practices put consumer
information at risk of misuse, and much of the misuse results from
theft in circumstances where no one would deliberately provide
information to the thief.
Take, for example, the relationship between identity theft,
one of the most serious forms of misuse, and security. Identity
theft is more widespread and pernicious than previously realized.
In September, the FTC released a survey showing that, in the year
preceding the survey, 3.23 million people-or 1.5% of the adult
population-were victims of identity theft, with new accounts
opened or other frauds committed in their name.25 An additional
22 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2003); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801 (2003).
23 The FTC has brought eight cases alleging violations of its Rule under the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act and obtained a total of $360,000 in
civil penalties.
24 During our initial review, our staff presented numerous press reports detailing
breaches of privacy where personal information was revealed improperly. As
we examined these reports, the vast majority of them appeared to be the result of
erroneous or unauthorized access, rather than deliberate sharing of information.
Although as discussed below, not all of these incidents are violations of the law,
our information security program seeks to prevent misuse in circumstances
where notice and choice would be ineffective.
25 FTC, FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in U.S. 27.3 Million Victims in
Past 5 Years, Billions in Losses for Businesses and Consumers, Identity Theft
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6.7 million people-or 3.19% of the adult population were
victims of account theft, in which thieves placed charges on
existing accounts, usually credit cards. 26 These numbers translate
to an estimated $48 billion in losses to businesses, nearly $5 billion
in losses to victims, and almost 300 million hours spent trying to
resolve the problem. 27 Other consequences also can be severe. Of
those victims who had new accounts or other frauds in their name,
fourteen percent were the subject of a criminal investigation,
fourteen percent were named in a civil suit, and thirty-five percent
were harassed by debt collectors as a result of the theft.
Although a great many identity theft victims-forty-two
percent-had no idea how the thief obtained their personal
information, twenty percent said the information was acquired by
Report (Sept. 3, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/idtheft.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The FTC
commissioned the survey to get a better picture of the incidence of identity theft
and the impact of the crime on its victims as part of the Commission's ongoing
Identity Theft program. The FTC's primary role in combating identity theft
derives from the 1998 Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act ("the
Identity Theft Act" or "the Act"), Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2003)). The Act directed the Commission to
establish the federal government's central repository for identity theft
complaints, to provide victim assistance and consumer education, and to provide
our identity theft complaints to law enforcement. The Commission also works
extensively with industry to help victims, including providing direct advice and
assistance when information has been compromised. The FTC has committed
significant resources to assisting law enforcement. Investigation and
prosecution not only stop the offender from corrupting another person's
financial well being, but also can deter would-be identity thieves from
committing the crime.
26 Account theft is a form of identity theft because credit card numbers or other
account numbers are considered a "means of identification" under the federal
identity theft criminal statute. Nonetheless, it differs substantially from other
forms of identity theft as used in the text. Despite its greater frequency, account
theft is discovered more quickly: forty percent of account theft incidents were
discovered in less than one week's time, compared to seventeen percent for
other forms of identity theft. In addition, account theft results in smaller losses
to business ($14.7 billion compared to $32.9 billion) and to consumers ($1.2
billion compared to $3.8 billion), and less time is needed to recover per incident
(sixty hours compared to fifteen hours).
27 These figures are for identity theft and account theft combined.
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theft.28 Some of this theft occurs the old fashioned way.
Information stolen from mailboxes accounted for seven percent of
victims, and lost or stolen wallets accounted for eight percent.
Other information thieves are more innovative, getting
personal information directly from consumers using high-tech
trickery. One such example we are combating is the practice of
"phishing" for consumers' sensitive financial information. 29 In
28 These results are based on all people who were identity theft victims in the
past five years. Another eleven percent reported that their information was
stolen during a commercial transaction, such as when a consumer rented a car.
29 The Commission brought its first "phishing" case in July 2003. See FTC v.
Unnamed Party, a minor, No. 03-5275 GHK (C.D. Cal. filed July 25, 2003). In
this case, the Commission alleged that the defendant, posing as America Online,
sent consumers e-mail messages claiming that there had been a problem with the
billing of their AOL accounts. The e-mail falsely represented to consumers that
if they didn't update their billing information, they risked losing their AOL
accounts and Internet access. The message directed consumers to click on a
hyperlink in the body of the e-mail to connect to the "AOL Billing Center."
When consumers clicked on the link they landed on a site that contained AOL's
logo, AOL's type style, AOL's colors, and links to real AOL Web pages. It
appeared to be AOL's Billing Center, but in fact, the Commission alleged, the
defendant had hijacked AOL's identity to steal consumers' identities. The
defendant's AOL look-alike Web page directed consumers to enter the numbers
from the credit card they had used to charge their AOL account. It then asked
consumers to enter numbers from a new card to correct the problem. It also
asked for consumers' names, mothers' maiden names, billing addresses, Social
Security numbers, bank routing numbers, credit limits, personal identification
numbers, and AOL screen names and passwords-the kind of data that would
help the defendant plunder consumers' credit and debit card accounts and
assume their identity online. According to the Commission's complaint, the
defendant used the information to charge online purchases and open accounts
with PayPal. In addition, he allegedly used consumers' names and passwords to
log on to AOL in their names and send more spam. Finally, the Commission
alleged that he recruited others to participate in the scheme by convincing them
to receive fraudulently obtained merchandise he had ordered for himself. The
Commission's complaint alleged that the defendant's e-mails to consumers were
deceptive; that the defendant "pretexted" consumers' personal information in
violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's prohibition on pretexting; and that
the defendant's billing of consumers' accounts constituted an unfair practice in
violation of section 5 the FTC Act. The Commission obtained a stipulated
permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from engaging in these
fraudulent practices.
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this scam, identity thieves send spam that appears to originate from
a company with whom the consumer already has an established
relationship-such as the victim's ISP or bank. The spam message
warns the consumer to update his or her "billing information," and
contains links to "look-alike" websites that are loaded with actual
trademarked images so that they look like a real company's
website. The scammers ask for credit card numbers, passwords,
Social Security numbers, and other information, and use it to order
goods or services or to obtain credit. These scammers initially
seemed to target customers of large ISPs, online auction
companies, and online payment providers. However, in the last six
to nine months, a number of financial institutions have been
targeted as well. Scammers have engaged in phishing by posing as
entities such as Discover, Citibank, Bank of America, and Best
Buy.30 Any institution with a large number of consumer accounts
is probably vulnerable to the "phishermen."
Other identity thieves exploit insider access or simply
resort to garden-variety breaking and entering. Consider the
widely reported TriWest 3 1 and TC132 incidents. TriWest, a health
insurance provider for Department of Defense employees,
experienced a burglary at its Phoenix, Arizona offices during
which laptops and computer hard drives were stolen. These
computers contained the names, addresses, dates of birth, and
Social Security numbers (and in some cases credit card numbers
and sensitive medical information) of about 562,000 health
insurance beneficiaries. 33 In the TCI breach, 30,000 consumer
30 In response to the Best Buy phishing incident reported in June 2003, the
Commission issued a consumer alert. See Consumer Alert FTC, Fraudulent
Email Seeks to Capture Consumer Information, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2003/06/bestbuyscam.htm (June 24, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
3' Adam Clymer, Officials Say Troops Risk Identity Theft After Burglary, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 1 at 12 (Late Edition).
32 Kathy M. Kristof & John J. Goldman, 3 Charged in Identity Theft Case, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al (Home Edition).
33 These beneficiaries were all members of the armed services, retirees or their
dependents. The breach occurred on December 14, 2002. See Clymer, supra
note 31.
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credit reports were stolen when a former employee of TCI
improperly used passwords and subscriber codes of TCI's
corporate clients to download credit reports from credit reporting
agencies' databases. 34 The perpetrator of this fraud was indicted
on charges of fraud and conspiracy. According to the indictment,
consumer victims reported that tens of thousands of dollars in
existing accounts had been depleted; new accounts had been
opened without their knowledge or authorization; credit cards held
in their names had been used without authorization; and their
addresses had been changed at various financial institutions
without their knowledge or consent.
35
34 The ex-employee, Philip Cummings, worked as a Help Desk representative at
TCI, and was arrested November 2002. TCI provides software and computer
equipment to credit grantors that enables them to obtain credit reports from the
credit bureaus. The credit bureaus assign a unique "subscriber access code" to
the credit grantors that is used, together with TCI's software or computer
equipment, to obtain the credit reports. According to the U.S. Attorney's
complaint, from 2000 until he was arrested in 2002, Cummings allegedly
worked with others to illegally obtain the credit reports of consumers. The
complaint alleges that members of the identity theft ring supplied him with
Social Security numbers, and he pulled the credit reports by using passwords
and subscriber codes of TCI's clients' to gain access to the credit bureaus'
databases. See Kristof, supra note 32.
35 See U.S. v. Philip Cummings, No. SI 03 Cr. 109 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov.
22, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/crimi/
uscummings 112202cmp.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Most identity theft cases are best addressed through criminal
prosecution. The FTC itself has no direct criminal law enforcement authority.
Under its civil law enforcement authority provided by section 5 of the FTC Act,
the Commission may, in appropriate cases, bring actions to stop practices that
involve or facilitate identity theft. See, e.g., Order, FTC v. Assail, Inc., W03 CA
007 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2003) (granting preliminary injunction) (defendants
alleged to have debited consumers' bank accounts without authorization for
"upsells" related to bogus credit card package); Final Order, FTC v. Corporate
Mktg. Solutions, Inc., CIV-02 1256 PHX RCB (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2003)
(defendants "pretexted" personal information from consumers and engaged in
unauthorized billing of consumers' credit cards). In addition, the FTC brought
six complaints against marketers for purporting to sell international driver's
permits that could be used to facilitate identity theft. See FTC, FTC Targets
Sellers Who Deceptively Marketed International Driver's Permits over the
Internet and via Spam (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/01/
idpfinal.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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The survey data, "phishing" scams, and the large-scale
incidents of breaches put identity theft and information security in
sharper focus for-law enforcement, policy makers, consumers, and
the media. They highlight both the value and vulnerability of
personal information to determined thieves and the necessity for all
participants to follow good information security practices, be they
a multinational corporation securing its network or a consumer
installing a firewall on a home computer. Notwithstanding good
security practices, we understand that some security breaches will
occur. When they do, vigorous criminal prosecution of the
information thieves and Internet scammers is important. But when
the breach occurs because companies failed to take reasonable
steps to protect their customers' information, law enforcement
action against the company may also be appropriate, and in fact,
the FTC has brought a series of cases challenging such practices.
VII. FTC Law Enforcement and Information Security
A. General Principles
The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the
Commission is section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which provides that
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are
declared unlawful. 3 6 The statute defines "unfair" practices as
those that "cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition." 37 Most FTC actions are based on
deception, however, which the Commission and'the courts have
defined as a representation or omission that is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances about a material
issue.
38
36 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2003).
37 Id. § 45(n).
38 In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984) (setting forth the
Commission's Deception Policy Statement in an Oct. 14, 1983 letter from the
FTC to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations).
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In addition, the Commission enforces a variety of specific
consumer protection statutes that prohibit specifically-defined
trade practices and generally specify that violations are to be
treated as if they were "unfair or deceptive" acts or practices under
section 5(a).39 The Commission enforces the substantive
requirements of consumer protection law through both
administrative and judicial processes.4n
To date, the Commission's security cases have been based
on deception.4 ' Companies have made explicit or implicit
promises that they would take reasonable and appropriate steps to
39 E.g., Cigarette Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003); Truth-in-Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2003); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003);
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2003).
40 For routine fraud cases, such as the Internet fraud cases discussed supra, the
Commission proceeds under § 13(b) of the FTC Act which authorizes the
Commission, through its own attorneys, to bring actions in federal district court
to seek injunctive relief against defendants' business practices. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b) (2003). The statute provides that this authority may be used "whenever
the Commission has reason to believe that any person, partnership, or
corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by
the FTC." See FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy,
Remarks at Aspen Summit, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
030819aspen.htm (Aug. 19, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology). In contrast, this section discusses the Commission's
security enforcement actions against sellers who normally do not make
deceptive claims and whose products normally are reputable. For those claims,
the Commission chose its administrative process.
41 Even when there is no claim regarding information security, the
Commission's unfairness authority could be used to attack unreasonable security
practices. When the injury or likelihood of injury from a security breach is
significant, there is substantial injury. For instance, if a breach exposed
sensitive financial information which was then used to perpetrate identity theft,
we would examine the security measures in place. If our examination revealed
inadequate measures that could be remedied easily at a low cost, the injury
would outweigh the countervailing benefits of avoiding the costs of precautions.
Moreover, consumers could not reasonably avoid the injury that stems from the
theft of information that they have entrusted to others. Thus, the Commission
could consider unfairness an appropriate theory of liability. On the other hand,
many, perhaps most, breaches would not cause substantial injury and/or occur
when all cost-effective security measures are in place. There should not be strict
liability for security breaches.
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protect sensitive information obtained from consumers. When
security measures are inadequate, those promises are deceptive.
B. Security Procedures Must Be Appropriate in the
Circumstances
Security can go awry even in large, sophisticated
companies with harmful consequences for consumers. The most
obvious problem occurs when a company inadvertently releases
sensitive personal information due to inadequate security
procedures. The Commission's first security case, Eli Lilly,42
involved such an inadvertent 43 disclosure despite promises to
maintain security. Specifically, in sending an e-mail to subscribers
of its Prozac website, Lilly put all of the subscribers' e-mail
addresses in the "To" line of the e-mail, thereby disclosing to each
subscriber the e-mail addresses of every other Prozac subscriber.
Given the sensitivity of the information involved, this was a
serious breach. At first glance, it would be easy to say it was just a
mistake and one that, given the ensuing publicity, was unlikely to
reoccur. But, the more appropriate analysis is to ask why the
breach occurred. Had the company followed reasonable
procedures in light of the sensitivity of the information to prevent
such breaches from occurring in the first place?
In this case, the FTC alleged that the answer was "no."
And in answering the question, the Commission, through its
complaint and order, set forth the general principles that guide our
information security program.
First, the Commission construed Lilly's privacy policy as a
promise to take steps "appropriate under the circumstances" to
42 Decision and Order, In re Eli Lilly and Co., File No. 012-3214, 2002 WL
972504 (F.T.C. May 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/
elilillydo.htm [hereinafter Eli Lilly Decision] (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); Complaint, Eli Lilly Decision, File No. 012-
3214, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm [hereinafter Eli Lilly
Complaint] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
43 Eli Lilly Complaint, supra note 42, 6. Lilly offered an e-mail reminder
service to its website subscribers. Although the reminders themselves included
only the recipient's e-mail address in the "To" line, Lilly's message terminating
the service included the addresses of all 669 subscribers.
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protect personal information.44 It did not see a claim of absolute
protection, and it did not hold Lilly to such an impossible standard.
Rather, it set forth an analysis that makes the reasonableness of the
company's efforts the central question in assessing whether there is
a violation. Thus, the complaint alleged that the breach resulted
from Eli Lilly's "failure to maintain or implement internal
measures appropriate under the circumstances to protect sensitive
consumer information.
'
"
45
Second, our analysis of what constitutes reasonable and
appropriate procedures is linked directly to the sensitivity of the
information collected by the company. Not all personal
information is the same-some facts, such as use of antidepressant
drugs, are more sensitive than others. Such sensitive information
is deserving of greater protection, precisely because the potential
consequences to the consumer of disclosure are greater.
C. Not All Breaches Are Violations of FTC Law
It is important to note that the Commission is not simply
saying "gotcha" for security breaches. Although a breach may
indicate a problem with a company's security, breaches can happen
44Id. 8. For example, the Lilly privacy policy stated that "Eli Lilly and
Company respects the privacy of visitors to its websites, and we feel it is
important to maintain our guests' privacy as they take advantage of this
resource." Id. 5(A)-5(B). The policy also informed consumers that the
company's websites "have security measures in place, including the use of
industry standard secure socket layer encryption (SSL), to protect the
confidentiality of any of Your Information that you volunteer.... These
security measures also help us to honor your choices for the use of Your
Information." Id.
45 Id. 7. The complaint described various deficiencies in Lilly's security
program, including
[failing] to provide appropriate training for its employees
regarding consumer privacy and information security; [failing]
to provide appropriate oversight and assistance for the
employee who sent out the email... and [failing] to
implement appropriate checks and controls on the process,
such as reviewing the computer program with experienced
personnel and pretesting the program internally before sending
out the email.
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even when a company has taken every reasonable precaution. In
such instances, the breach will not violate the laws that the FTC
enforces. Instead, the Commission recognizes that security is an
ongoing process of using reasonable and appropriate measures in
light of the circumstances. When breaches occur, our staff reviews
available information to determine whether the incident warrants
further examination. If it does, we gather information to enable us
to assess the reasonableness of the procedures in place in light of
the circumstances and whether the breach resulted from the failure
to have such procedures. Using this analysis, in dozens of
instances, we have concluded that FTC action is not warranted.
When we find a failure to implement reasonable procedures,
however, we act.
D. Violations of the Law Without a Known Breach
Because appropriate information security practices are
necessary to protect consumers' privacy, companies cannot simply
wait for a breach to occur. Particularly when they promise
security, they have a legal obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate steps to guard against reasonably anticipated
vulnerabilities. Just because no breaches have yet occurred does
not mean that the company had in place-and followed-
reasonable procedures.
Our case against Microsoft, which focused on its Passport
online authentication service, establishes this principle.46 Like Eli
Lilly, Microsoft promised consumers that it would keep their
information secure.47 Unlike Lilly, there were no specific security
46 Passport is an Internet sign-on service that allows consumers to sign in at
multiple Websites with a single username and password. Passport Wallet and
Kids Passport are add-on services that facilitate online purchasing and parental
consent. At the time of our case, Passport contained 200 million accounts.
47 See Complaint, In re Microsoft Corp., File No. 012-3240 (F.T.C. Aug. 8,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O02/O8/microsoftcmp.pdf
[hereinafter Microsoft Complaint] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology). Microsoft's privacy policy represented that the Passport
system "achieves a high level of Web Security by using technologies and
systems designed to prevent unauthorized access to your personal information"
and further promised that Passport "is protected by powerful online security
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breaches that triggered the case. Nevertheless, we alleged that
there were significant security problems that, left uncorrected,
could jeopardize the privacy of millions of consumers. In
particular, we alleged that Microsoft did not employ "sufficient
measures reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances to
maintain and protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal
information obtained through Passport and Passport Wallet. 'A8
Specifically, the Commission alleged that Microsoft failed to have
systems in place to prevent unauthorized access, detect
unauthorized access, monitor for potential vulnerabilities, and
record and retain system information sufficient to perform security
audits and investigations. 49 Again, sensitive information was at
issue-in this case, financial information including credit card
numbers.
E. Good Security Is an Ongoing Process of Assessing
Risks and Vulnerabilities
One clear feature of information security is that the risks
companies confront will change over time. Hackers and thieves
will adapt to whatever measures are put in place, and new
technologies likely will have new vulnerabilities waiting to be
discovered. As a result, companies need to assess the risks they
face on an ongoing basis and make these adjustments that are
necessary to reduce these risks. The Commission's third security
case, against Guess?, Inc. ("Guess"), highlights this crucial aspect
of information security in Web-based applications and the
databases associated with them. Databases frequently house
technology and a strict privacy policy." Id. 3-4. As in Lilly, the Commission
construed the policy as a promise to provide "measures reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances to maintain and protect the privacy and
confidentiality of personal information obtained from or about consumers in
connection with the Passport and Passport Wallet services." Id. 6.48 Id. 7.
49 Id. Besides failing to deliver on its security promises, the Microsoft complaint
alleged other privacy violations. The complaint alleged that Microsoft's
collection of consumers' sign-in history was not disclosed. The complaint
further alleged that Microsoft misrepresented to parents that they could control
information collected about their children for Kids Passport service.
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sensitive data such as credit card numbers, and Web-based
applications are often the "front door" to these databases. It is
critical that online companies take reasonable and appropriate steps
to secure these aspects of their systems, especially when they have
made promises about the security they provide for consumer
information
50
In Guess, the Commission alleged that the company broke
such a promise concerning sensitive consumer information
collected through its website, www.guess.com. According to the
Commission's complaint, by conducting a relatively basic "Web-
based application" attack on the Guess website, an attacker gained
access to a database containing 191,000 credit card numbers. This
particular kind of attack was well known in the industry and has
appeared on a variety of lists of known vulnerabilities.
5 l
50 Decision and Order, see In re Guess?, Inc., File No. 022-3260, 2003 WL
21406017 (F.T.C. June 18, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/
guessdo.pdf [hereinafter Guess Decision] (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); Complaint, Guess, 2003 WL 21406017,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guesscomp.pdf (July 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Guess Complaint] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology). Guess promised that its website "has security measures in place
to protect the loss, misuse and alternation of the information under control."
Complaint, Guess, 2003 WL 21406017, 6. The company further stated that
"[a]ll of your personal information including your credit card information and
sign-in password are stored in an unreadable, encrypted format at all times. This
Website [sic] and more importantly all user information is further protected by a
multi-layer firewall based security system." Id. In addition to attacking the
claim that all personal information is stored in an unreadable, encrypted format
at all times, the Commission also construed the company's statements as claims
that "they implemented reasonable and appropriate measures to protect the
personal information they obtained from consumers through www.guess.com
against loss, misuse, or alteration." Id. 14.
5I The industry press began to cover Web-based application vulnerabilities and
solutions long before Guess' vulnerability to Web-based application attacks was
exploited. See, e.g., Mandy Andress, Developers play vital role in web app
security (Apr. 5, 2001), InfoWorld, at http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/
tc/xmI/0 1/04/09/010409tcwebsecsb.xml (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology); Mandy Andress, Taming the Wide Open Web, Business
Security Advisor Magazine, at http://doc.advisor.com/doc/07377 (Feb. 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Mandy
Andress, Web apps are Trojan horses for hackers (Apr. 5, 2001), InfoWorld, at
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According to the complaint, Guess did not: (1) employ commonly
known, relatively low-cost methods to block Web-based
application attacks; (2) adopt policies and procedures to identify
these and other vulnerabilities; or (3) test its website and databases
for known application vulnerabilities, which would have alerted it
that the website and associated databases were at risk of attack.52
Essentially, the company allegedly had no system in place to test
for known application vulnerabilities or to detect or to block
attacks once they occurred. Even if the system was state of the art
when it was put in place, companies that promise security have an
obligation to monitor that system, and make reasonable changes to
monitor and address new threats.53
As in prior cases, the emphasis in Guess is on
reasonableness. When the information is sensitive, the
vulnerabilities are well known, and the fixes are cheap and
relatively easy to implement, it is unreasonable simply to ignore
the problem.
VIII. Remedies
Perfect security is not possible in any reasonable sense.
There will always be thieves among us, and occasionally they will
succeed. Just as we have not expected perfection in assessing
whether a section 5 violation exists, our orders do not require
companies to achieve perfection. The most important relief we
obtain is to require a comprehensive security program that takes
http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/tc/xml/01/04/09/010409tcwebsec.xml (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
52 Guess Complaint, supra note 50, 8-9. In addition, the complaint alleged,
Guess misrepresented "that the personal information it obtained from consumers
through www.guess.com was stored in an unreadable, encrypted format at all
times;" but in fact, after launching the attack, the attacker could read the
personal information, including credit card numbers, in clear, unencrypted text.
Id. 12-13.
53 See id. 15. The Guess complaint focused on vulnerabilities that should have
been known by at least 1998. The case challenged the reasonableness of steps
taken since that time, not the adequacy of the system when it was first
developed.
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into account the sensitivity of the information collected and
includes an ongoing assessment of reasonably foreseeable risks
and threats to information the company collects. We modeled the
order provision requirements on the requirements of the FTC
Safeguard Rule ("Rule") under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.54
The Rule became effective on May 23 of this year, and I expect
that it will quickly become an important tool to ensure greater
security for consumers' sensitive financial information. Whereas
our section 5 cases to date have derived from misstatements
particular companies make about security, the Rule requires a wide
variety of financial institutions to implement comprehensive
protections for customer information-many of them for the first
time. Each institution must develop a written plan55 that takes into
account its particular circumstances-its size and complexity, the
nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of the
customer information it handles.56 The Rule could go a long way
54 In May 2002, the Commission finalized its Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards
Rule which implements the security requirements of the Gramm Leach Bliley
Financial Modernization Act of 1999. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2003). The Rule
requires financial institutions under the FTC's jurisdiction to develop and
implement appropriate physical, technical, and procedural safeguards to protect
customer information.
55 As part of its plan, each financial institution must: (1) designate one or more
employees to coordinate the safeguards; (2) identify and assess the risks to
customer information in each relevant area of the company's operation, and
evaluate the effectiveness of the current safeguards for controlling these risks;
(3) design and implement a safeguards program, and regularly monitor and test
it; (4) hire appropriate service providers and contract with them to implement
safeguards; and (5) evaluate and adjust the program in light of relevant
circumstances, including changes in the firm's business arrangements or
operations, or the results of testing and monitoring of safeguards. The
Safeguards Rule requires businesses to consider all areas of their operation, but
identifies three areas that are particularly important to information security:
employee management and training, information systems, and management of
system failures. See FTC, Financial Institutions and Customer Data:
Complying with the Safeguards Rule, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/
buspubs/safeguards.htm (Sept. 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).56 Id. The Commission has issued guidance to businesses covered by the
Safeguards Rule to help them understand the Rule's requirements. Commission
staff have met with a variety of trade associations and companies to learn about
industry experience in coming into compliance with the Rule, to discuss areas in
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to reduce risks to this information, including the risk that it will be
used to facilitate identity theft.
The Rule's flexible performance standard found its origins
in the Commission's previous research in this area. In May 2000,
the Commission's Advisory Committee on Online Access and
Security issued its final report ("Report").57 Although the Report
addressed security only in the online context, the Commission
determined that many of its conclusions applied to information
security practices generally and adopted them when promulgating
the Safeguards Rule. For example, the Report recognized that
security is a process, requiring continuous monitoring and
adjustment to address new hazards as they emerge. Thus, no one
static standard can assure adequate security. As a result, the
Report recommended that each website maintain a security
program that is "appropriate to the circumstances."
The recognition that effective security is an ongoing
process has also guided the nature of remedies we have adopted in
individual cases. In each case, the key relief is a requirement that
the company establish an information security program, modeled
of our Safeguards Rule. Core elements ofafter the requirements fo r l.8  so
which additional FTC guidance might be appropriate, and to gain a better
understanding of how the Rule is affecting particular industry segments. Since
the Rule's effective date, the staff also held two training sessions for the public,
and over 400 people attended. Now that the Rule is effective, we are conducting
sweeps to assess compliance within various covered industry segments.
57 F.T.C., FINAL REPORT OF THE FTC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ONLINE
ACCESS AND SECURITY, at http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/finalreport.htm
(May 15, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
The FTC appointed forty members to the Advisory Committee who represented
varied viewpoints on implementing access and security online. Members
included representatives from online businesses, trade associations, computer
security firms, database management companies, privacy and consumer groups,
as well as academics, experts in interactive technology, and attorneys. The
Advisory Committee held four public meetings, and in addition, members
worked in subgroups to address specific topics in more depth.
58 See Eli Lilly Decision, supra note 42, II. The order requires the company to
"establish and maintain an information security program for the protection of
personally identifiable information collected from or about consumers." Id. The
"program shall consist of: A. designating appropriate personnel to coordinate
and oversee the program; B. identifying reasonably foreseeable internal and
external risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal
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that program have included putting appropriate personnel in charge
of the program, conducting a comprehensive risk assessment in all
relevant areas of the business, designing appropriate safeguards to
control these risks and regularly monitoring their effectiveness,
adjusting the program as needed, and documenting all elements of
the program in writing.
One area where our orders have differed is requirements for
outside audits. Monitoring security systems and the environment
to identify new and emerging threats and vulnerabilities is a crucial
element of any sound security program. Much of that monitoring
will be internal to the company. External monitoring through an
audit offers a more independent perspective, and can be very
useful to us in assessing order compliance. By its nature, however,
it is more of a snapshot of a security program at a particular point
in time.
In Lilly, the order requires an annual written review by
"qualified persons"--that is, persons qualified to perform the audit
whether within the company or from outside. In Microsoft,
however, we required an external audit every two years. In our
view, the enormous complexity of the security problems that
Microsoft is likely to confront, and the difficulties we would likely
confront in assessing their compliance from outside the company,
necessitated a requirement for external audits. Similarly, in Guess,
the order required an external audit every two years; however,
unlike the Lilly and Microsoft orders, it also listed the type of
information expected in the auditor's report. 59 We added this new
information, including any such risks posed by lack of training, and addressing
these risks in each relevant area of its operations, whether performed by
employees or agents, including: (i) management and training of personnel; (ii)
information systems for the processing, storage, transmission, or disposal of
personal information; and (iii) prevention and response to attacks, intrusions,
unauthorized access, or other information systems failures." Id.
59 Guess Decision, supra note 50, Il. For example, the order requires that the
audit report set forth "the specific administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards that Respondents have implemented and maintained during the report
period." Id. Ill(A). The order also mandates that the audit report explains how
such safeguards are appropriate to company's size and complexity, the nature
and scope of the company's activities, and the sensitivity of the personal
information collected form or about consumers. Id. Ill(B).
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provision to provide additional guidance to the company and its
auditors, and we think it will be helpful to everyone in ensuring
and assessing compliance.
A flexible information security program as required by our
Safeguards Rule and individual orders is a sound approach to the
security problem. It protects consumer information without
imposing rigid technologically-specific standards as a remedy. To
do otherwise would likely engender a false sense of security and
send a misleading message to industry. We could easily identify
desirable technologies, such as intrusion detection or particular
network architectures, but there is no magic bullet that will provide
the appropriate level of security for all systems. If a company
believes a particular technology or product solves all of its security
problems, then it is likely not conducting a comprehensive risk
assessment or taking other necessary steps to ensure that its
systems are truly secure. Moreover, to specify a magic bullet
neglects the obvious and rapid change of both technology and
threats to those technological systems. As noted earlier, security is
an ongoing process, and companies need to conduct periodic risk
assessments and adjust their programs in light of what they find.
For that reason, although our complaints have described the
problems we have found, we have not charged that the failure to
adopt a particular technology constitutes a violation, and we have
not imposed such requirements in our orders.
A. Notice in Cases of Security Breaches
Another potential remedy for information breaches is
notice to affected parties. 60 Determining when notice is warranted
and to whom notice should be given should be done on a case-by-
case basis. Thus, when breaches occur, notice may not be
appropriate in all circumstances.
Notice to consumers whose information may have been
compromised is potentially attractive because it enables these
consumers to take steps to protect themselves. The value of notice
60 For example, the recently-passed California law requires notice in certain
circumstances where a breach has occurred, exposing consumer information.
See 2003 Cal. Legis. Sev. 241 (West).
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depends on the likelihood that the information will be misused and
on whether there are additional reasonable steps that consumers
can take to reduce the risk of loss. If the circumstances of the
breach indicate that information is in fact being used for identity
theft, or that such misuse is highly likely, notice is likely to be
extremely valuable. 61 Depending on the type of information
compromised, consumers can take appropriate steps such as
closing accounts, placing a fraud alert on their credit report to
prevent new fraudulent accounts from being opened, or examining
their report to clear up any fraudulent information that may be
62affecting their creditworthiness.
There may be some situations where, in addition to
consumers, or even in lieu of direct notification to consumers by
61 Our identity theft survey found that victims who quickly discovered that their
information was being misused were less likely to incur out-of-pocket expenses
and resolved their problems more quickly. No out-of-pocket expenses were
incurred by sixty-seven percent of those who discovered the misuse less than 6
months after the misuse began. Only forty percent of victims who took 6
months or longer to discover the misuse were able to avoid incurring some such
expenses. Seventy-six percent of consumers who discovered that their
information was being misused less than a month after the misuse began spent
less than ten hours resolving their problems. Where the misuse was discovered
one to five months after the misuse began, fifty-nine percent of victims spent
less than ten hours resolving their problems. Where it took six or more months
to discover the misuse, only twenty percent of victims were able to resolve their
problems in this amount of time.
62 The credit reporting agencies will place a fraud alert on a consumer's reports
in order to alert users of the reports to be aware of the possibility of fraud before
they open accounts in the name of the consumer. Fraud alerts are most useful
when the type of information that has been compromised could be used to open
new accounts such as social security numbers, driver's licenses, addresses and
birth dates. The major credit reporting agencies also will block information in a
consumer's files resulting from identity theft if the consumer provides them with
a police report. Although these programs are currently voluntary on nationwide
basis (they are mandatory in a few states), the Commission has recommended
that Congress codify them as part .of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on the "Fair Credit
Reporting Act": Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/
0307 10fcratestsenate.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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the compromised business, other parties should receive notice
(e.g., credit reporting bureaus, credit card issuers). Because some
consumers will inevitably fail to receive, act upon, or, perhaps,
understand the notice sent to them, or because the costs of notice
may outweigh the benefits to consumers, it could be useful for a
business that suffers a breach to notify other relevant parties. For
example, if only credit card numbers were compromised, notifying
the credit card issuers so that they can monitor and close affected
accounts may be an alternate solution to blanket notification of
consumers. Because the credit card companies bear financial risk
of unauthorized transactions, they have incentives to be vigilant
and have mechanisms already in place to contact consumers about
questionable transactions. Furthermore, consumers' options for
self-help are no different from what the credit card companies
would do: monitor and close affected accounts. Thus, the cost of
notice to consumers might outweigh any benefits given the ability
of the credit card companies to identify and stop injury.
In other cases, however, notice to consumers or other
parties may have little or no value. When a database has been
compromised, it may be discovered that the perpetrator was only
trying to prove that the system could be breached, or it may be
difficult to determine exactly which information has been stolen, or
even whether any information was stolen. Individualized notice to
consumers in such an instance would raise concerns for no
particular reason. Moreover, if consumers did react to the warning
by, for example, placing a fraud alert, the value of the fraud alert as
a signal of a real risk of fraud might be reduced as creditors spend
time and money checking for fraud where it doesn't exist.
Experience has shown us that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to notification. Instead, notice to consumers and others
should hinge upon the likelihood that the information compromise
will result in actual injury. This determination itself hinges upon
numerous factors including the type of information compromise,
the nature of the compromise, or the intent of the perpetrator, if
known. Still, I think we have developed practical advice for
businesses to consider when they are the source of an information
breach. Notice is, of course, just the beginning of the education
process for businesses and consumers.
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B. Education
Our education efforts focus on prevention of harm by
making sure businesses and consumers are paying attention to the
steps they can take to minimize the risks to personal information
and the harm that results from misuse of personal information.
Through our fraud enforcement work, we know that the hazards
resulting from poor information security practices are not unique to
the Internet and that an educated business and consumer often
present the best defense against the seemingly endless parade of
scams, whether tech-based or not.
In September 2002, we launched an extensive and ongoing
education campaign featuring Dewie, the e-Turtle, focusing on
steps businesses and consumers can take to secure sensitive
information. 63 Most recently, the Commission has published alerts
addressing risks to computer systems 64 and the risks associated
with file-sharing.65
The FTC has taken the lead in coordinating with other
government agencies and organizations in the development and
dissemination of comprehensive consumer education materials for
victims of identity theft and those concerned with preventing this
crime. The FTC's extensive consumer and business education
campaign includes print materials, media mailings, and radio and
television interviews. The FTC also maintains the identity theft
website, which includes the publications and links to testimony,
reports, press releases, identity theft-related state laws, and other
resources. 66
63 See FTC Introduction, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/infosecurity/
index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
6 See FTC, Security Check. Reducing Risks to your Computer Systems, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubsIbuspubs/security.htm (June 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).65 See FTC, File-Sharing: A Fair Share? Maybe Not, at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/sharealrt.htm (July 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).66 See ID Theft Home, at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft (last visited Nov. 13,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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We held workshops to explore emerging technologies and
their impact on information security practices. As head of the U.S.
delegation to the OECD Experts Group for Review of the 1992
OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems, FTC
Commissioner Orson Swindle led efforts to revise the Guidelines,
which were finalized in August 2002.67 In all of these efforts, our
central message is that commercial security practices are simply
one aspect of a much larger and more comprehensive "culture of
security" that must be developed across all sectors of our economy
if we are to protect our vital national information infrastructure.
IX. Conclusion
One key lesson of our privacy agenda is that, of course,
principles matter. An institution that merely reacts to
circumstances and does not work from a coherent philosophy will
ultimately fail to achieve lasting success. Our cases demonstrate
these principles in action. Second, our extensive experience in
consumer privacy issues has taught us that maintaining good
privacy practices is an important part of reducing cybercrime of all
types that puts consumer information at risk-from online hacks to
low-tech dumpster dives. Whether the information thief is an
insider or a remote hacker, the critical lesson in this information-
based economy is that government, private industry, and
consumers must all take appropriate steps to protect personal
information and the systems that house it.
67 See FTC, OECD Issues Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems
and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/
08/oecdsecurity.htm (Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
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